

implemented which would profit from any time gained. (Tel 620) --- (TAB 1)

2. 5:26 a.m. -- Ambassador Muccio replied to the Department's 620 that he did not plan further evacuation unless the situation worsened. (Tel 954) --- (TAB 2)

3. 5:49 a.m. -- Request received from Ambassador Muccio that air cover be maintained until evacuation of dependent women and children was concluded. (Tel 955) --- (TAB 3)

4. 6:02 a.m. -- Appeals of the Korean National Assembly to the President and Congress of the United States and the UN General Assembly for support and effective and timely aid were received from Embassy Seoul. (Tel 951) --- (TAB 4)

5. 6:14 a.m. -- Ambassador Muccio reported a Norwegian ship had evacuated 682 dependents from Korea; about 300 potential dependent evacuees, including non-Americans, remained at Pusan or were enroute there. (Tel 953) --- (TAB 5)

6. 8:09 a.m. -- Embassy Moscow questioned the tactical desirability of a direct approach to the Soviet Government in accordance with the Department's telegram 538 (June 25, Entry 28). Embassy suggested confining the representation to the routine procedure of notifying the Soviet Government of the action taken in the UN and to urging Soviet cooperation in seeking a solution of the question. This would permit a Soviet withdrawal when the risks became clear. (Tel 1734) --- (TAB 6)

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7. 9:31 a.m. -- Ambassador Muccio reported that he had extended evacuation toward the South to all American families because of the deterioration of the situation; he would proceed to Taejon but it might not be possible for all to get out. (Tel 957) ----- (TAB 7)

8. 10:00 a.m. -- Secretary Acheson requested Ambassador Muccio's views as to whether it would be preferable to send General Roberts or General Hodge to Korea, both officers being available. (Tel 622) ----- (TAB 8)

9. 10:15 - 10:50 a.m. -- The Secretary telephoned Senator Connally, Judge Kee, and Senator Wiley to give them an account of the Department's action in the crisis, and said that the situation appeared to be in hand. He said also that the President did not wish him to discuss the matter before the Congressional Committees for the present. (Memoranda) ----- (TAB 9)

10. 1:45 p.m. -- Judge Kee telephoned the Secretary to request that someone be sent up to the Committee to provide a briefing on the Korea situation, especially the matter of supplies. The Secretary said this would be difficult as current reports indicated things were not going so well. He promised to call Judge Kee back later. (Memorandum) ----- (TAB 10)

11. 3:33 p.m. -- Ambassador Muccio reported that he was taking all necessary security measures including destruction of classified documents and papers. (Tel 961) ----- (TAB 11)

12. 3:50 p.m. -- The Korean Ambassador delivered the appeal of the Korean National Assembly to the President in the presence of the Secretary of State. The President stated that munitions were being sent, but that the Koreans must manage to continue effective resistance. (Memorandum) ----- (TAB 12)

13. 5:07 p.m. -- Ambassador Muccio reported that the Embassy was in danger of being cut off, and that the Korean President and Cabinet had departed from Seoul. The Ambassador proposed to remain in Seoul until the bitter end with a small staff. Part of Embassy had evacuated to the South. (Tel 966) ----- (TAB 13)

14. 5:55 p.m. -- Mr. Bohlen from Paris in a personal message to Mr. Kennan supported the position of the Moscow Embassy (No. 6) that vigorous countermeasures should be taken by the US and UN in Korea but that the Soviets should not be forced publicly into a position from which they could not retreat.

(Tel 3113) ----- (TAB 14)

15. 6:15 p.m. -- Ambassador Bruce reported the personal view of a French Foreign Office official (Parodi) that if U.S. troops were sent to Korea the Russians would not make war there or elsewhere; he was disappointed with the "phlegmatic" British reaction.

(Tel 3118) ----- (TAB 15)

16. 6:54 p.m. -- Ambassador Muccio reported that President Rhee and Cabinet had left Seoul; Captain Sihm said the fight would be over by afternoon, despaired of saving anything, and inquired as to possibility of the President and Cabinet moving to Japan as a "government in exile". The Ambassador made no commitment. (Tel 967) ----- (TAB 16)

17. 7:00 p.m. -- A circular telegram to all missions provided background information on the invasion of South Korea and requested that the Department be kept fully informed on local reactions. (Circular tel) ----- (TAB 17)

18. 7:00 p.m. -- The Department instructed Embassy Moscow to approach the Soviet Union in accordance with Department's telegram of June 25, (Of. June 24-25, Entry 28 and above No. 6) giving as reasons the desire to make clear to the Soviets

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the tactic of aggression by satellites would be
resisted, and the desire to counter the Soviet peace offensive.

The original instruction is modified, however, to refer to the
Soviets' "close relations" with North Korea rather than their
"controlling influence". (Tel 540) ----- (TAB 18)

19. 9:00 p.m. -- The Department instructed Ambassador
Muccio and staff to leave Seoul before safe departure became
impossible, as it was inadvisable they become hostages.

(Tel 483 to Tokyo repeated to Seoul re 629) ----- (TAB 19)

20. 9:00 p.m. -- Blair House meeting attended by the
President, civil and military officials of the Defense
establishment, Secretary Acheson and Messrs. Matthews, Rusk,
Hickerson, and Jessup. It was decided that the President
would meet with Congressional leaders at 11:30 the next day
to inform them of the actions taken by this Government. Secre-
tary Acheson suggested and the President agreed that: 1) the
Navy and Air Force be instructed to offer the fullest possible
support to the South Korean forces and that such support be
limited to the area South of the 38th parallel; 2) orders be
issued to the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa, the
National Government of China be told to desist from operations
against the mainland, and the Seventh Fleet be ordered to effect
this; 3) U.S. military forces in the Philippines be increased
and aid to the Philippines accelerated; 4) aid to Indochina be
stepped up and a strong military mission sent there. The
Secretary suggested that it would be desirable for the Presi-
dent to make a statement on this policy the next day (See Annex A).
Secretary Johnson expressed his pleasure over the proposals
made by the Secretary of State. The President approved the
resolution to be offered in the Security Council the next day.
Mobilization measures were discussed but no final decisions were
taken. (Memo by Jessup; list of Department recommendations for

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21. 11:12 p.m. -- Ambassador Muccio informed the Department his party would leave Seoul with the last KMAC party for Siheung at 1500 Korean time, June 27, possibly proceeding to Taejon under cover of darkness if the situation deteriorated.

(Unnumbered tel.)

(TAB 21)

22. 11:19 p.m. --The Hague Embassy reported Foreign Minister Stikker's view that Korea was a "test case", that American troops should be used, and that Russia would then back down.

But the Queen's chief political adviser gave as the consensus of Dutch opinion: "Korea will be lost as result of American default, as usual." (Tel 773)

(TAB 22)

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Annexed Documents and Background Information

A - Release Statement by the President.

B - Memorandum on Under Secretary's Meeting, 10 a.m., June 26, 1950.

C - P/POL Special Guidance on Korea, June 26, 1950, Nos. 2, 3, 4,

D - Memorandum of Conversation: Franklin Roosevelt, Jr. - Ben

H. Brown, Jr. (H), June 26, 1950.

E - Drumright Letter, July 5, 1950. (Placed here because the events related center about June 26,

F - Korean Ambassador's Press Conference.

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Summary of Actions and Decisions - June 27, 1950

(All entries are in EDT; on incoming telegrams the time of receipt is used.)

1. 1:00 a.m. — The Department instructed sixteen principal missions to advise the respective Foreign Offices of the substance of the statement which the President would release at approximately noon EDT on US action to be taken under the Security Council resolution of June 25. To Moscow as information only. (Tel 3124 to London, etc.) - - - - - (TAB 1)

2. 1:00 a.m. — The Department instructed Charge Strong at Taipei to deliver an Aide-Memoire to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek personally, stating that the US Fleet had been ordered to prevent an attack against Formosa, and that the US was confident the Generalissimo would cooperate by ordering a cessation of his operations against the mainland. (Telcan 39) - - - - - (TAB 2)

3. 4:24 a.m. — Charge Gullion at Saigon reported the consensus of opinion in Indo-China was that UN or US action would be unavailing in Korea, that the Soviet aim to complete the conquest of continental Asia was now manifest, that the US counter-action would be a test of Indo-China's chances for aid when its turn came. (Tel 513) - - - - - (TAB 3)

4. 8:55 a.m. — Embassy Moscow reported that the Indian Counsellor was seeking information on how far the US was prepared to go both within and without the UN to assist the Republic of Korea; Counsellor Kapus said India wanted to know "whether US was prepared to risk World War III over Korea"; Madame Pandit was such

a "bust" in Washington, June 27, 1950